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REMARKS: <i>Orig H/C to Det By NIO. And by to DD CT</i>		
FROM: <i>NIO/USSR-EE</i>		
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TALKING POINTS ON KAL SHOOT DOWN

For Moscow, the KAL is an international political event of the first magnitude whose ramifications Moscow will be coping with over the next six months and beyond.

The Emerging Line

- It is clear the Soviets are going to hang-tough that the real responsibility for the shoot down rests with the U.S.
- They have made some inroads among those initially outraged, and their obfuscations will be persuasive to those who don't want to think the worse of the Soviet Union; India's tepid response to the shoot down is a good example.
- We can expect Moscow to pull-out all of the active measure stops to blacken the US, and especially this President and this Administration.
- A massive anti-US propaganda campaign is already underway. All manner of US "nastiness" past, present and future will be put forward for domestic and world consumption.
- The leadership will also use this incident to bolster its campaign for vigilance at home. This effort will have a direct effect on the US and other Western presence in the USSR. Although their set-up of the US Vice Consul in Leningrad was probably planned before the KAL shootdown, how they have played the expulsion foreshadows increasingly severe harassment.

West Europe and INF

- Limiting the damage in Western Europe and to their anti-INF campaign is Moscow's top priority.
- The Soviets are trying to make the shoot down a US-Soviet issue. This is intended to divert attention from the incident itself and Soviet fanaticism about their borders, while allowing the Soviets to pick-up on their anti-US, anti-INF themes.
- One variation is that the incident underlines the hair-trigger atmosphere created by the US, and for which arms control agreements are a partial solution. This idea was not invented in Moscow, but, quietly, the Soviets will play it for all it is worth in Western Europe and the U.S.

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- Another is that the international atmosphere is so tense that it would be dangerous to proceed with INF deployment.
- The timing of Moscow's carrot and stick maneuvers may be pushed back somewhat, in order to let the "hullabaloo" dissipate.
- But its unlikely that the fundamentals of the Soviet position on INF will be changed by the KAL shoot down. We still think the Soviets are not likely to agree to a compromise allowing some US deployments. If anything, the Soviets have more reason to avoid giving the Reagan administration a political victory.
- Moscow's problem will be how to be tough with the US without alienating Western Europe. One answer is to work harder with some West European politicians to undermine the US position. Indeed, Andropov recently sent a letter to Willie Brandt indicating that the KAL incident made it more important that they work together for an agreement.

The US

- From Moscow's perspective, the US--and the President personally--jumped on the shoot down with malice to damage Soviet interests in the world regardless of affects on the bi-lateral relationship. To Soviet leaders the sacrifice of 269 innocents is not an act of barbarism, but merely a consequence of protecting one's national interests; therefore, they find it hard to understand that US leaders might be genuinely outraged.
- The Soviets are likely to interpret that reaction as more evidence that the President is implacably opposed to their interests, and fundamentally uninterested in making political arrangements that the USSR can live with.
- It seems likely the Soviets were uncertain before the KAL episode how far they were willing to go to reach agreements (the LTA on grain, for example) that might--in their view--help the President be re-elected. But the balance has probably now moved irretrievably toward undermining the Administration.
- It is not likely that the Soviets believe they have many cards to play.

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- They will try harder to isolate the US from the West Europeans, and perhaps they will be more inclined to work the China angle.
- They may also be even nastier in the Middle East and Central America and Africa.
- They will continue the harsh anti-US rhetoric and the active measure campaign.
- The principal purpose of these activities will be to send a message to the American people that the Administration is responsible for the dangerous deterioration in US-Soviet relations.
- Moscow probably does not rate its chances of success as very great. But we cannot be certain just how hard, and how many risks Andropov is willing to take.
- While we do not believe they will go as far as to send offensive missiles or other nuclear systems into Cuba in response to INF, the odds have increased--even if marginally--as a result of the KAL shoot down.

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